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SUMMARY 
The work at hand presents the results of an analysis of 51 accidents at German level crossings regarding 
human error contribution on the part of road traffic users. The results indicate that a half-barrier protection 
does not provide a strong enough barrier effect to prevent accidents. It is shown that, overall, 41% of all 
accidents in the sample happened at such half-barrier level crossings, thus making up for the second largest 
share following light signal system layouts. Accidents at full-barrier protected level crossings and level 
crossings without technical protection in the sample are negligible. The findings from the investigation of 
human error types leading to accidents at half-barrier level crossings are of particular interest. Using the 
GIDAS framework for human error categorisation in the automotive domain, they reveal that 73% of errors 
occur in the planning stage of human information processing. Violations of rules like deliberately bypassing 
closed barriers are most prevalent. Countermeasures to minimise the occurrence of such accidents at half-
barrier level crossings are discussed. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite the fact that accidents at level crossings only account for a fairly small share of all road traffic 
accidents, they are of particular relevance because of their severe consequences for property and persons. 
Unlike road traffic users, train drivers need not stop at level crossings. They have to trust in the roadside 
protection systems to ensure clear tracks upon train approach as their ability to react to hazards and to 
prevent collisions is limited. Due to the large mass of the train combined with fairly high speeds and low 
frictional resistance of steel tire and rail, braking distances are rather long. Consequently, 94% of all 
collisions between road users and rail vehicles in Germany originate from misconduct on the part of a road 
user (1). 
Especially accidents at level crossings without barrier protection often lead to the public calling for the setup 
of barriers in order to improve safety. A considerable amount of collisions, however, still occurs at level 
crossings with half-barrier protection systems. Since errors of train drivers and operators or technical failures 
in such accidents are scarce, a deeper understanding of the contributing errors of road users at such 
seemingly advanced level crossing protection layouts was sought in this work, using a systematic approach 
of error categorisation. 
First the most common protection setups are described, in order to provide an understanding of the specific 
features of German level crossing layouts. In the second section, an overview of error classification methods 
based on psychological models of human information processing is presented and a description of the 
GIDAS (German In-Depth Accident Study) approach selected for this analysis is given (2). A broad variety of 
documents regarding level crossing accidents is then reviewed and categorised according to the selected 
framework in the third part of this work and statistical analysis of the distribution of human error types at 
different level crossing setups is conducted. Based on the identified critical steps in information processing, 
conclusions about issues in interaction design and options for improvement of the current layout at German 
level crossings are derived and discussed from a human centered perspective in the last section. 
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PROTECTION AT GERMAN LEVEL CROSSINGS 
Trains differ from road traffic users regarding specific characteristics which require strict rules for the shared 
space at level crossings. In particular, trains are track-bound, with long braking distances due to high mass 
and speed together with low frictional resistance and run according to fixed timetables. Rail vehicles 
therefore always have the right of way over road vehicles at German level crossings (3). Different signs and 
technical layouts (Table 1) are applied as means of protection to indicate this priority.  
In Germany, all level crossings are announced by three successive rectangular white signs on both sides of 
the road. Depending on distance to the level crossing upon approach, these signs display either a triple 
(240m), double (160m) or single (80m) diagonal red bar. 
At the furthest distance of 240m in front of the level crossing a triangular warning sign, depicting either a 
train or a barrier icon, is added. The St. Andrew’s cross is mounted on both sides of the road right in front of 
the railway track. It signifies priority of rail traffic at every level crossing. 
 
Table 1: Protective elements at German level crossings (drawings adapted from Giesa& Bald, 2003 (4))  
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Figure 1: Protection systems at German level crossings (8) 
The application of additional protective technology depends on regulations regarding the specific criticality of 
the respective level crossing (Table 2). Road traffic density, number of tracks and road/ track type (e.g. 
highway, urban road, rural road/ main track, secondary track) and railside speed limit, among others, are 
criteria that influence the protective layout at level crossings [ (3), (5) ].  
If criticality is rated medium to high for rail as well as for street parameters (e.g. a public road traffic density 
of 100 – 2500 motor vehicles and a speed limit up to 160 km/h on the track), level crossings can be 
protected using a light signal system with or without half-barriers (3). Level crossings with an even higher 
criticality have to be protected with full-barriers and an automatic level crossing clear detection. Level 
crossings with a lower criticality both for rail and road do not have to be equipped with technical protection 
systems. These types of level crossings are announced solely by signs, as described in Table 1. In addition, 
an unobstructed view of the tracks by the road traffic users has to be ensured to enable them to check 
whether a train is approaching (3). Additionally, train drivers have to blow the whistle at a predefined 
distance upon approach of such level crossings to provide for a supplementary acoustic warning to road 
traffic users [ (6), (7)].  
Out of the 22201 level crossings in Germany, the biggest share of 10059 in total is not equipped with any 
technical protection systems. Neither light signals nor barriers are installed, meaning the crossing railway is 
announced solely by signs. 
Table 2: Level crossing protection, depending on the criticality of road and railway 
6527 
29% 
1517 
7% 
10059 
45% 
4098 
19% 
Half-barrier
Light signal
Without technical
protection
Full-barrier
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The second largest share of German level crossings consists of half-barrier level crossings. Overall, 6527 
level crossings are equipped with this type of barrier system. It is usually also furnished with light signals or 
flashing lights.  
The highest protection level, consisting of a full-barrier with or without additional light signals and an 
automatic level crossing clear detection, is fitted at 4098 German level crossings. Level crossings with light 
signals but without additional barriers account for the smallest share of all level crossings in Germany. A 
total of 1527 level crossings are equipped with red- and- yellow light signals or red flashing lights (8). 
  
CLASSIFICATION OF HUMAN ERROR 
A reliable categorisation framework is required in order to reach a dependable insight into the underlying 
mechanisms of human error in level crossing accidents. 
Numerous experts have developed approaches to describe the nature of human error from a cognitive 
psychology perspective for different applications. 
Most approaches share the description of human error in terms of failure in a specific step within a sequence 
of information processing steps. Identifying the critical step in information processing can help to gather 
insights into the weaknesses of a system design. If errors can frequently be assigned to one certain step 
within the process, this indicates an unfitting system design regarding the adequate support of the user. Two 
of the most recognized contributions in the field of human error are Reason’s generic error modelling system 
(9) and Rasmussen’s model of internal human malfunction (10). 
In his taxonomy, Reason defines three basic error types which occur at different stages of task completion. 
These error types are slips, lapses and mistakes. Slips are errors that occur at the stage of task execution, 
when a plan that is actually correct is misapplied. Lapses are errors resulting from omissions of necessary 
actions. They occur in an intermediate state of information processing and result most often from insufficient 
retrieval of important information from memory or lack of attention. While slips emerge when a correct plan is 
applied incorrectly, mistakes comprise errors that result from plans that are inherently faulty in the respective 
situation. Mistakes occur at the planning stage of information processing. Another type or rather class of 
error is described by Reason as violations. Such human errors differ from the other three categories in the 
sense that violations manifest themselves through deliberately committing faulty actions.  
Similar to Reason’s classification, Rasmussen’s model of internal human malfunction is based on the 
assumption of distinct stages of human information processing, each of which can lead to the emergence of 
specific errors. In his categorisation, he differentiates seven types of human errors that enable the rater to 
identify the critical step of information processing which in turn leads to the occurrence of an error (Table 3). 
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Since Rasmussen’s model was not originally developed for error analysis in the automotive domain, but for 
accident analysis in industrial operations, Graab, Donner, Chiellino and Hoppe (2008) reviewed its 
applicability for human error categorisation in road traffic accidents (2). According to findings from their 
German in Depth Accident Study (GIDAS), strategy selection errors and action errors as described by 
Rasmussen rarely occur in the automotive context. A subdivision into five meaningful error categories 
resulted to be sufficient for describing the causes of all potential roadside accidents. 
Maintaining the sequential procedure of human information processing, the GIDAS categories are 
accordingly labelled information access (German: “Informationszugang”), information admission 
(“Informationsaufnahme”), information evaluation (“Informationsverarbeitung”), planning (“Zielsetzung”) and 
operation (“Handlung”).  
Table 3: Error taxonomy from the model of internal human malfunction 
Table 4: GIDAS error categorisation  
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In order to categorise the errors in more detail, each can be assigned general influences and specific 
indicators that comprise the cause of human error. 
Since it is the purpose of this work to identify contributing human factors in level crossing accidents, and the 
major share (94%) of them is caused by road traffic users (8), the GIDAS categorisation was deemed to 
provide the most suitable approach. It offers the necessary depth and detail for the analysis of error 
causation, is specifically tailored to the application in road traffic accident analysis and spares superfluous 
fragmentations. 
 
METHODS 
The sources reviewed to generate the analysed accident sample consist of official accident reports of the 
Eisenbahnbundesamt (EBA - German federal railway authority), police reports and newspaper articles. 
Reviewed material was restricted to level crossing accidents that happened in Germany between the years 
2000 and 2012 in order to ensure comparability regarding laws and layouts, which differ between 
neighbouring European countries. 
To be included in the analysis, all descriptions had to be documented in enough detail to be unambiguously 
assigned to one of the five error categories of the GIDAS classification (information access, information 
admission, information evaluation, planning or operation) by two independent experts. A total number of 
n=51 from initially 126 level crossing accident descriptions could thus be analysed in this work. 75 reports 
had to be excluded because of insufficient detail of description.  The remaining 51 accidents were clustered 
by type of safety layout (without technical protection: n=4, light signal: n=25, half-barrier: n=21, full-barrier: 
n=1).  
 
RESULTS 
Looking at the level crossing accident sample clustered by protection layout showed that 21 of 51 analysed 
accidents in Germany happened at half-barrier equipped level crossings. A slightly larger share of accidents 
in the sample occurred at level crossings that are equipped with light signal protection. Accidents at level 
crossings without technical protection (4) as well as accidents at level crossing with a full-barrier (1) were 
scarce (Figure 2).  
21 
25 
4 1 
Half-barrier
Light signal
Without technical
protection
Full-barrier
Figure 2: Distribution of level crossing accidents in the sample over the different safety systems 
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Regarding the underlying human error according to the GIDAS error categories (information access, 
information admission, information evaluation, planning and operation), a chi-square test of the equality of 
frequency distribution was carried out. It revealed that the general frequency distribution of the human error 
categories over all 51 events was unequal in a highly significant fashion (Χ²=31,45; df=4; p<0,0001). Overall, 
most accidents (78%) could be assigned to one of the two error types of information admission or planning 
(Figure 3).  
 
 
Assuming that the presence of a barrier protection system on a level crossing is a deciding factor in the type 
of human error committed by the road traffic user, level crossing protection layouts were separated into 
“barrier level crossings” (half and full) and “non-barrier level crossings” (light signals without technical 
protection) for a more detailed investigation for each of two classes. Comparing the distribution of assigned 
error types at barrier level crossings and non-barrier level crossings revealed statistically significant 
differences (Χ²=20,42; df=4; p<0,001; Figure 4).  
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Figure 3: Distribution of the types of human error leading to accidents in the sample 
Figure 4: Types of human error in accidents at level crossings with and without half-barriers 
  
Grippenkoven, Giesemann & Dietsch  The Role of Human Error in Accidents on 
German Aerospace Centre (DLR)   German Half-Barrier Level Crossings  
8 
 
At level crossings with light signals 13 out of 25 accidents were assigned to the GIDAS category information 
admission. Errors of this type outweighed all other error types, resulting in a significantly unequal distribution 
of error types (Χ²=16,4; df=4; p=0,003).  
At level crossings with barrier protection systems, by contrast, accidents could primarily be assigned to the 
category of planning according to GIDAS. In a total of 15 out of 21 cases errors were found at this stage, 
which led to a highly significant unequal distribution of assigned error types (Χ²=24,5; df=3; p<0,0001). 
Considering influences and indicators, it appeared that planning errors at barrier-protected level crossings 
were predominantly comprised of acts of deliberate bypassing of closed half-barriers. 
 
DISCUSSION 
When examining the distribution of accidents according to type of protection system at German level 
crossings, it becomes apparent that a remarkably large share occurs at level crossings with light signals as 
well as at half-barrier layouts. 
Half-barrier protection as a safety layout for level crossings of medium to high criticality shows considerable 
effects when comparing the general share of installation in Germany to the share of accidents in the sample. 
Almost one-third of German level crossings (29,4%) are equipped with this protection system type (Figure 
1), which appears to convey a more noticeable warning than the often overlooked light signal systems. 
However, with 41,2% of accidents in the analysed sample taking place at these crossings, it seems that the 
benefit towards accident prevention is only marginal.  
It is also striking that while results do not suggest that half-barriers prevent accidents much more effectively 
than light signal systems, they seem to affect the underlying types of errors that lead to accidents.  
As the findings from the GIDAS error categorisation distribution indicate, errors on the part of the road user 
undergo a clear shift from not noticing the displayed warnings to deliberately violating traffic rules (Figure 4). 
In these cases, drivers appear to make a conscious decision to drive around closed half-barriers. 
This suggests that risks perceived by drivers committing such planning errors might not match the actual 
high risks associated with the action of bypassing the barriers.  
Risk can be described as the product of probability of occurrence and severity of consequences for an event 
(11). Planning errors, that lead to accidents at half-barrier level crossings could either result from an 
underestimation of the probability for the event “train approaching” or inadequate expectations regarding the 
severity of possible consequences from bypassing barriers, or even both. Disadvantageous risk-perceptions 
could be further reinforced by erroneous learning effects due to prolonged barrier closing times. If road users 
repeatedly experience a long time interval passing between the barriers closing and the train actually 
arriving at the level crossing, the perceived probability of a collision in case of bypassing might decrease 
while the perceived benefit of saving time through driving around the barrier might grow at the same time.  
Future development of safety measures at half-barrier level crossings should be aligned with the findings 
that planning represents the prevalent type of human error as shown in this work. Three different 
approaches to enhance safety based on the described insights are thus proposed to prevent accidents at 
half-barrier level crossings. 
First, following a psychological approach in order to modify risk perception of road users especially at half-
barrier level crossings is suggested. 
Additional perceivable evidence of a train actually approaching while people are waiting in front of a level 
crossing with half-barrier protection should be provided. The introduction of acoustic signalling by the train 
drivers as it usually only has to be done at level crossings without technical protection systems (6) could be 
a possible and easy to implement means to enhance such evidence. In case of two trains passing during 
one closing interval, a digital display announcing the second oncoming train after the first one has passed 
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could also be useful. This might counteract the possible misperception of road traffic users that it is safe to 
bypass the still closed half-barriers after one train has passed.  
Besides a more adequate perception of the probability of a train approaching, providing a viable notion of 
the severity of consequences is believed to increase the road user’s subjectively perceived risk to a more 
suitable level. The willingness to take the risk of violating traffic rules and bypass half-barriers should 
thereby be decreased. Measures to enhance people’s awareness of the life-threatening consequences of 
being hit by a train seem essential to achieve this.  
Warning campaigns are obvious measures to improve risk perception. These campaigns should be focused 
on the area surrounding the level crossings. Billboards (e.g. depicting cars after collisions with trains) could 
be placed upon approach to the level crossing in some distance. It is crucial for such installations to be 
easily perceivable without interfering with the recognition of level crossing related traffic signs. A minimum 
distance of 240m from the level crossing (distance of the first crossing indicator; Table 5) is suggested. 
Another influential factor on rule violations at level crossings is impatience on the part of the road user. As 
Seehafer (1997) describes, exhibition of impatient behaviour (e.g. starting up the engine again) linearly 
increases with the time spent waiting in front of a half-barrier (12). If an additional time buffer is found to 
prolong the time from barrier closure to train arrival at half-barrier level crossings this effect has to be 
considered.  
It appears useful to critically question the idea of a “safety buffer” through extended closing times as it might 
lead to an even more dangerous increase in readiness of bypassing.  
The second suggested approach to reducing planning errors at half-barrier level crossings thus targets 
drivers’ impatience while waiting. Waiting is a large part of everyday life, waiting in line at the supermarket, 
waiting for the next bus, waiting for the rain to stop and so on. Waiting is generally perceived as rather 
boring and a waste of time by most people.  
This notion is intensified, when there is no indication for how long it will take and there is no distraction 
available, as it usually is the case with waiting at level crossings. The main idea here is providing alternative 
activities while waiting in front of a closed half-barrier. Drivers should be given the opportunity to pass time in 
an attractive or useful fashion. Very simple setups like a trashcan placed besides the road that could invite 
people to a useful activity by getting rid of garbage in the car. The layout of such installation could also try to 
target sportsmanship by inviting drivers and passengers to compete in “scoring baskets”. 
Another way to provide pastimes could be via QR-codes at level crossings. These black and white square 
patterns can be read by smartphones and lead users to a web page. Content referred to at level crossings 
could be mini games that drivers can play while waiting. An additional incentive like high score lists or 
competitive modes with other drivers in could further enhance the appeal of waiting. Such games might also 
have an educational character, informing about safety issues at level crossings. 
These first two approaches described are merely virtual attempts to reduce the probability of planning errors 
from a psychological perspective, by raising risk awareness and offering alternative activities while waiting. 
Without physical measures a road traffic user who wants to bypass a closed half-barrier is still able to do so. 
To ensure prevention of level crossing accidents that result from planning errors and violations in particular, 
the impeding character of the half-barrier protection needs to be increased. 
The third approach discussed here, therefore suggests the implementation and improvement of physical 
barrier protection systems.  
Full-barrier level crossings appear as a comparatively safe means to prevent level crossing accidents. With 
an equipped share of 18,5% among German level crossings (Figure 1), only one single accident was found 
in the sample occurring here (Figure 2). The conclusive explanation for this seems to be the mere physical 
barrier between road user and track. Obviously, full-barriers span the entire width of the level crossing and 
can not be bypassed easily. From a safety perspective, physical barriers that simply can not be evaded by 
road traffic users should be implemented more often. However, furnishing all level crossings in Germany 
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with full-barrier protection systems is unfeasible, because it is both complex and expensive for the reasons 
of the high safety integrity level that has to be met and the operational processes and regulations that have 
to be regarded. Future research on level crossing safety should therefore be concerned with the 
development of innovative protection concepts and inexpensive alternative solutions to the commonly used 
full-barrier layouts with automatic level crossing clear detection. 
A good example for such concepts can be found at Russian level crossings.  Here, platforms are being 
pulled up from street level, creating a barrier from outside and an off-ramp from inside the level crossing 
(Figure 6). 
  
This solution has a great advantage over full-barrier setups, as road traffic users can not get locked in on the 
level crossing. Such a ramp system could be added to a half-barrier level crossing to lock it across the entire 
width of the road without compromising the ability of clearing the crossing after closure. 
 
CONCLUSION 
When comparing half-barrier protection systems to level crossings with light signals, the accident analysis 
conducted in this work reveals that half-barriers merely influence the cause of accidents but apparently do 
not prevent them more effectively. Instead of overlooking them, as road users sometimes do with light 
signals, closed half-barriers are deliberately bypassed. To reduce the amount of accidents at half-barrier 
level crossings in the future, three approaches are presented. The most promising solution seems to be the 
improvement of physical barriers, which renders deliberate bypassing difficult to impossible. Additionally, 
psychological approaches towards enhancing subjective risk perception and offering alternative activities to 
pass time while waiting should be taken into consideration to promote safe behaviour. 
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